| Are we human because of unique traits and | | | | machines and humans (bionics)? At which point does |
| attributes not shared with either animal or machine? | | | | a human turn into a machine? And why should we |
| The definition of "human" is circular: we are human by | | | | assume that free will ceases to exist at that - rather |
| virtue of the properties that make us human (i.e., | | | | arbitrary - point? |
| distinct from animal and machine). It is a definition by | | | | Introspection - the ability to construct self-referential |
| negation: that which separates us from animal and | | | | and recursive models of the world - is supposed to |
| machine is our "human-ness". | | | | be a uniquely human quality. What about introspective |
| We are human because we are not animal, nor | | | | machines? Surely, say the critics, such machines are |
| machine. But such thinking has been rendered | | | | PROGRAMMED to introspect, as opposed to humans. |
| progressively less tenable by the advent of | | | | To qualify as introspection, it must be WILLED, they |
| evolutionary and neo-evolutionary theories which | | | | continue. Yet, if introspection is willed - WHO wills it? |
| postulate a continuum in nature between animals and | | | | Self-willed introspection leads to infinite regression and |
| Man. | | | | formal logical paradoxes. |
| Our uniqueness is partly quantitative and partly | | | | Moreover, the notion - if not the formal concept - of |
| qualitative. Many animals are capable of cognitively | | | | "human" rests on many hidden assumptions and |
| manipulating symbols and using tools. Few are as | | | | conventions. |
| adept at it as we are. These are easily quantifiable | | | | Political correctness notwithstanding - why presume |
| differences - two of many. | | | | that men and women (or different races) are |
| Qualitative differences are a lot more difficult to | | | | identically human? Aristotle thought they were not. A |
| substantiate. In the absence of privileged access to | | | | lot separates males from females - genetically (both |
| the animal mind, we cannot and don't know if animals | | | | genotype and phenotype) and environmentally |
| feel guilt, for instance. Do animals love? Do they have | | | | (culturally). What is common to these two |
| a concept of sin? What about object permanence, | | | | sub-species that makes them both "human"? |
| meaning, reasoning, self-awareness, critical thinking? | | | | Can we conceive of a human without body (i.e., a |
| Individuality? Emotions? Empathy? Is artificial | | | | Platonian Form, or soul)? Aristotle and Thomas |
| intelligence (AI) an oxymoron? A machine that passes | | | | Aquinas think not. A soul has no existence separate |
| the Turing Test may well be described as "human". | | | | from the body. A machine-supported energy field |
| But is it really? And if it is not - why isn't it? | | | | with mental states similar to ours today - would it be |
| Literature is full of stories of monsters - Frankenstein, | | | | considered human? What about someone in a state |
| the Golem - and androids or anthropoids. Their | | | | of coma - is he or she (or it) fully human? |
| behaviour is more "humane" than the humans around | | | | Is a new born baby human - or, at least, fully human |
| them. This, perhaps, is what really sets humans apart: | | | | - and, if so, in which sense? What about a future |
| their behavioural unpredictability. It is yielded by the | | | | human race - whose features would be |
| interaction between Mankind's underlying immutable | | | | unrecognizable to us? Machine-based intelligence - |
| genetically-determined nature - and Man's | | | | would it be thought of as human? If yes, when |
| kaleidoscopically changing environments. | | | | would it be considered human? |
| The Constructivists even claim that Human Nature is | | | | In all these deliberations, we may be confusing |
| a mere cultural artefact. Sociobiologists, on the other | | | | "human" with "person". The former is a private case |
| hand, are determinists. They believe that human | | | | of the latter. Locke's person is a moral agent, a being |
| nature - being the inevitable and inexorable outcome | | | | responsible for its actions. It is constituted by the |
| of our bestial ancestry - cannot be the subject of | | | | continuity of its mental states accessible to |
| moral judgment. | | | | introspection. |
| An improved Turing Test would look for baffling and | | | | Locke's is a functional definition. It readily |
| erratic patterns of misbehaviour to identify humans. | | | | accommodates non-human persons (machines, |
| Pico della Mirandola wrote in "Oration on the Dignity | | | | energy matrices) if the functional conditions are |
| of Man" that Man was born without a form and can | | | | satisfied. Thus, an android which meets the |
| mould and transform - actually, create - himself at will. | | | | prescribed requirements is more human than a brain |
| Existence precedes essence, said the Existentialists | | | | dead person. |
| centuries later. | | | | Descartes' objection that one cannot specify |
| The one defining human characteristic may be our | | | | conditions of singularity and identity over time for |
| awareness of our mortality. The automatically | | | | disembodied souls is right only if we assume that |
| triggered, "fight or flight", battle for survival is | | | | such "souls" possess no energy. A bodiless intelligent |
| common to all living things (and to appropriately | | | | energy matrix which maintains its form and identity |
| programmed machines). Not so the catalytic effects | | | | over time is conceivable. Certain AI and genetic |
| of imminent death. These are uniquely human. The | | | | software programs already do it. |
| appreciation of the fleeting translates into aesthetics, | | | | Strawson is Cartesian and Kantian in his definition of a |
| the uniqueness of our ephemeral life breeds morality, | | | | "person" as a "primitive". Both the corporeal |
| and the scarcity of time gives rise to ambition and | | | | predicates and those pertaining to mental states |
| creativity. | | | | apply equally, simultaneously, and inseparably to all the |
| In an infinite life, everything materializes at one time | | | | individuals of that type of entity. Human beings are |
| or another, so the concept of choice is spurious. The | | | | one such entity. Some, like Wiggins, limit the list of |
| realization of our finiteness forces us to choose | | | | possible persons to animals - but this is far from |
| among alternatives. This act of selection is predicated | | | | rigorously necessary and is unduly restrictive. |
| upon the existence of "free will". Animals and | | | | The truth is probably in a synthesis: |
| machines are thought to be devoid of choice, slaves | | | | A person is any type of fundamental and irreducible |
| to their genetic or human programming. | | | | entity whose typical physical individuals (i.e., members) |
| Yet, all these answers to the question: "What does it | | | | are capable of continuously experiencing a range of |
| mean to be human" - are lacking. | | | | states of consciousness and permanently having a list |
| The set of attributes we designate as human is | | | | of psychological attributes. |
| subject to profound alteration. Drugs, neuroscience, | | | | This definition allows for non-animal persons and |
| introspection, and experience all cause irreversible | | | | recognizes the personhood of a brain damaged |
| changes in these traits and characteristics. The | | | | human ("capable of experiencing"). It also |
| accumulation of these changes can lead, in principle, | | | | incorporates Locke's view of humans as possessing |
| to the emergence of new properties, or to the | | | | an ontological status similar to "clubs" or "nations" - |
| abolition of old ones. | | | | their personal identity consists of a variety of |
| Animals and machines are not supposed to possess | | | | interconnected psychological continuities. |
| free will or exercise it. What, then, about fusions of | | | | |